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The events of the February and October Revolutions in Russia in 1917 have been the 
subject of an immense body of historical literature, establishing a clear timeline of how the 
revolution began with the overthrow of the Tsar in February and culminated in the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in October. Historians have debated, analyzed, and established the historical 
significance of the key revolutionary events of that year; The February Revolution, the April 
Crisis, the July Days, the Kornilov Affair, and the declaration of Soviet Power. Recent scholars 
like Matthew Rendle and Igor Grebenkin have contributed significantly to understanding the 
revolution within the context of the Great War, building on the authority of Allan K. Wildman’s 
significant social history on the Russian Imperial Army to include diverse studies on the officer 
corps as well as soldiers and command staff. Allan K. Wildman, with his two-volume study “The 
End of the Imperial Russian Army,” published in 1980 and 1987, established a body of work on 
the final days of the Russian Imperial army, capturing the experience of soldiers, officers, and 
command staff during the revolution and comprehensively discussing the deeply rooted social 
issues plaguing the army. Matthew Rendle and Igor Grebenkin’s works qualify and quantify both 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity within the army’s ranks, most notably among 
the officer corps, and explores the relations between soldiers, officers, and command staff. 
However, one revolutionary event remains relatively understudied compared to the other widely 
recognized historical events of the revolution due to its military nature. Even the historians who 
focus on the revolution through the lens of the Russian army pay it little attention or incorporate 
it into a larger theater of discussion. That revolutionary event is the June Offensive of 1917.  





 In June of 1917, the Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia launched a major 
military offensive against the Austro-German forces in Galicia on the 300-kilometer span of the 
Southwestern front, pushing toward Lvov. Already facing strained soldier-officer relations, mass 
desertions, and failing supply lines, the offensive took only days to collapse. The offensive 
shattered soldiers’ morale, confidence in the Provisional Government, and furthered the 
disintegration of the army. Coming right after a political crisis over the issue of the Russian 
state’s war aims and the democratization of the army and soldier-officer relations, the June 
Offensive of 1917 had established the war as one of the most central and contentious issues of 
the Russian Revolution. Not only was it a turning point in the war, but it was as Louise Erwin 
Heenan describes it, it was a “phase of revolution.”1 It clearly demonstrated the failure of the 
Provisional Government to properly respond to popular revolutionary aspirations and contributed 
significantly to the later flashpoints of revolutionary conflict that were the July Days and the 
Kornilov Affair. The offensive also served to bind moderate socialists to the liberals on 
continuing the unpopular war, the same way liberals had been bound to conservatives in 
continuing the Tsarist war at the outset of the February Revolution. Building on the work of the 
only English-language scholar to study this event, Louise Erwin Heenan, this essay seeks to 
explore the role of the June Offensive in the Russian Revolution as the central event of the 
Russian Revolution. Analyzing the state of the Russian army before and during the revolution, I 
aim to explore the relations between soldiers, officers, command staff, as well as their 
relationships with the Provisional Government around the June Offensive. I seek to explain why 
the Provisional Government insisted on launching the offensive and to explore the reasons why it 
ultimately failed. This essay ultimately aims to weave the June Offensive into the story of the 
February Revolution, examining its consequences on the political course as a turning point of the 





revolution and the political leanings and attitudes of social groups within the military 
surrounding the offensive throughout the course of 1917.  
 
The Russian Imperial Army 
 In order to understand the June Offensive and the collapse of the Russian army during the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, one must first investigate the structure, state, and history of the 
Russian army leading up to the revolution and even before the great war. In his monograph on 
the Russian army entitled The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the 
Soldiers’ Revolt, Allan K. Wildman claimed that “the upheaval in the Army cannot be viewed 
separately from the social upheaval.”2 Wildman acknowledges that mass armies absorb and 
represent the conflicts of their societies at large, and become a social and political microcosm of 
the nation at large.3 The Russian Imperial army was the only Tsarist institution to completely 
carry over into the revolution intact and faces its political developments head on as a symbol of 
the old order.4 Critical contemporaries, largely liberals and socialists, viewed the Russian 
Imperial Army as a bastion of aristocratic privilege and autocratic power. However, the social 
composition of the army and the officer corps had undergone significant change since the time of 
the Great Reforms, including more non-noble elements as modernization took precedent over 
preserving the social hierarchy.  
 The monarchy and the Army were closely bound together in a wide-sweeping set of 
moral, physical, and cultural ties.5 The nobility was given the duty of being the exclusive 
military class in the early modern Muscovite state, and nearly all organs of state power were 
militarized from the bureaucracy to the organization of noble families.6 Under Peter the Great, 
however, the military and civilian hierarchies were separated and the state structure operated 





under a more secular and western tone.7 Status was solely derived from service to the state, with 
military service being of much greater social value than civilian service or service to the Holy 
Synod.8 The highest grade of service, and therefore status, to the Tsar was given by the officer 
corps of the regiment of the guards.9 Guard officers were from the highest pedigree and groomed 
for their positions from very early on in their lives, with everything from their school, type of 
arms, and their regiment planned from birth for generations upon generations.10 Thus, the officer 
corps of the regiment of the guards was created as and remained an organ of aristocratic power, 
privilege, and influence, as well as being a symbol of service to the Tsar. These guard officers 
enjoyed extensive privileges and elite education, which allowed them to disproportionately swell 
the upper ranks of the command staff and build a solid conservative core in the upper command 
staff. 
 After Russia’s sobering defeat in the Crimean war, the autocracy realized that widespread 
reforms bringing modernization and westernization were desperately needed. In this context, the 
upper ranks of the Russian Imperial Army were dealing with reforms that were eating away at its 
sacred traditions and institutions. The leadership of the army, in undergoing the process of 
professionalization due to the Miliutin reforms of the 1870s, was also becoming less 
aristocratic.11 A growing pool of raznochintsy, middle class, clergy and peasants, was penetrating 
into the ranks of the officer corps and lower command staff upon completion of military training 
at junker schools and professionalized military academies.12 By 1894, only 53 percent of junker 
school trainees were of noble origin, and by 1905 only 37 percent of junker school trainees were 
of noble origin.13 In 1912-13, only 9 percent of students at the Alekseevsk military school were 
of noble origin, down from 43 percent in 1876-7.14 The incentive to become an officer was great, 
as the privilege and status awarded, despite being of non-noble origin, was substantial. However, 





nobles were still afforded great privilege and streamlined promotions, still dominating the upper 
military leadership, to which the increasingly non-noble elements within the army and lower 
ranks of the officer corps, looked upon with great disdain.15  
 The Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905 broke the insulation of military 
personnel from revolutionary rhetoric. An army composed of men from all backgrounds, classes, 
and ages brought into the army during years of reforms, who were more educated than previous 
generations due to increased industrialization and social reforms, had experienced the collective 
trauma of defeat and revolution.16 Bolshevik, Menshevik, and Socialist Revolutionary military 
sections sprang up and focused on agitation in the military ranks.17 Mobilization of heterogenous 
reservists had brought to the army the popular revolutionary rhetoric that accompanied the unrest 
of the Revolution of 1905, ending generations of insularity from national political 
developments.18 The Great Reforms of the 1860s had created an increased urban population that 
became increasingly politicized and organized, allowing peasants to voice their concerns through 
the courts and petitions.19 The army came to be equally subject to radicalization as was any other 
part of Russian society due to the influx of politically activated reservists.20  
Many units were called to fire upon civilians in order to suppress local unrest, and some 
units promptly refused. On January 7, 1906, the governor of Tomsk Guberniia reported that 
“’discharged reservists beat up the volost’ elder, freed arrested peasants, and threatened to tear up 
the volost’, burn down administrative buildings, and murder the police captain and his men.”21 In 
June of 1906 in Tambov, the Seventh Reserve Cavalry Regiment was sent to subdue a peasant 
revolt in a village called Petrovka and refused to follow orders to fire.22 Many officers and 
soldiers around the time of the 1905 revolution organized politically and drafted resolutions for 
the first time, as Matthew Rendle describes, “It was a formative experience for many who played 





pivotal roles in 1917.”23 However, the image of soldiers’ brutal repression of rebellious workers 
and peasants persisted, feeding the popular view of the army, and the officer corps in particular, 
as an instrument of counterrevolution protecting the institutions of autocracy.  
 
The Great War 
 The greatest and final challenge the Russian Imperial Army would face before its total 
collapse would be that of the First World War. By the end of 1915, 3.4 million casualties were 
suffered by the Russian army, and in the first ten months of the war casualties exceeded 3 
million.24 At the onset of the war, the Russian army faced “poor field communications, 
disproportionate firepower, an archaic supply system” and a heavy defeat at Tannenberg in East 
Prussia.25 However, the Russian Army managed to push deep into Galicia and Austrian Poland 
and fend off German advances in Poland proper.26 Despite these particular successes, 
ammunition expenditures, supply consumption, and casualty rates “astronomically exceeded all 
prewar calculations.”27 Mismanagement by the autocracy and the army command staff had eaten 
away at Imperial Russia’s economy, contributing to significant shortages on the home front. On 
the topic of sweeping government failures, Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov addressed the Fourth 
Russian State Duma on November 1st, 1916, asked “Is it stupidity or treason?” when decrying 
the disastrous persecution of the war effort by the Tsarist leadership.28 
In the rear, mass mobilization faced a significant degree of resistance in the countryside. 
Across provincial Russia, mobilized reservists deserted, revolted, police were beaten, property 
was destroyed, riots occurred, even collection and distribution centers and public infrastructure 
was destroyed.29 The war effort prompted the army to conscript almost half of the rural labor 
force’s males and requisition the livestock and horses of peasants.30 Conscription left families 





without male providers and families were denied pay from their husband’s military service.31 A 
May 14th 1916 letter to the war minister from peasant women expounded their suffering from the 
war, “We…have given the government our husbands, our sons, our brothers, our fathers. And 
now that is not enough for the government. It is going to exterminate us with hunger.”32 In 
Mogilev and Kazan, mobilized reservists tore through aristocratic estates, looting them, and 
rallied peasants to join them.33 Many villages were openly hostile to conscription and requisition 
of their provisions as illustrated in two July 23rd police reports from the Kazan and Stavropol’ 
provinces.34 The first report describes mobilized reservists setting fire to and rampaging through 
aristocratic estates, while the second report describes reservists refusing to deploy to the front 
and refusing the requisition of their horses as they proceeded to destroy a zemstvo school.35 
Historian John Keep succinctly describes the state of the war on rural Russia, stating that 
civilians “in town and country found themselves caught up in a desperate struggle to meet the 
insatiable demands of a conflict in which prospects of victory seemed ever more remote.” 36 
However, most soldiers were still committed to their posts and not willing to face the 
consequences of active revolt.37 Rather, they resigned themselves to “self-wounding, voluntary 
capture, foot dragging, or desertion to the rear.”38 In 1916 a group of severe mutinies occurred in 
which entire units refused orders to attack.39 A report from the 22nd Infantry Division describes 
two regiments blocking a third regiment from being moved up for an attack and threatening to 
fire, and in the 17th Rifle Regiment of the 20th Siberian Rifle Division, An anonymous letter 
“warned the commanding officer that the regiment would not take part in the attack,” prompting 
them to be swapped out with another regiment.40 The 223rd Odoevskii Regiment mutinied but 
remained in fighting condition, after which 23 agitators were selected for trial and five were 
executed.41  





  The war also contributed significantly changed the composition of the army, accelerating 
the existing trends of past reforms. From April 1914 to January 1917, the army swelled from 1.2 
million personal to 6.6 million, and the officer corps swelled from 40,590 to 145,916.42 Officers 
were dying at staggering rates, prompting the command staff to set up officer training schools 
and commission an unprecedented number of NCOs (Give a brief sentence about what NCOs 
are).43 The result was an officer corps of extremely heterogenous backgrounds with a lower 
standard of training. In 1916, only 4 percent of junior officers were of noble origin. 44This influx 
chipped away at the strong conservative base of the officer corps, creating a social division 
between the lower and upper commands. The increasingly non-noble officer corps contributed 
significantly to the development of an overwhelming anti-autocratic consensus in early 1917 and 
began a shift toward a more liberal and moderate socialist core of officers.  
 Altogether, numerous military failures, crippling supply shortages, unprecedented human 
losses, and colossal economic strain alienated and disaffected much of the population, including 
soldiers. As the war progressed and the Russian army continued to experience a deteriorating 
fighting capability, the social transformations and divisions in the army came to a head. As the 
developing anti-autocratic consensus crystallized into the February Revolution of 1917, the 
monarchy fell because, as Peter Kenez writes, “the army was unwilling to defend it.”45 The 
increasingly weary, tired, and politically inclined army found themselves in the midst of a 
revolution in which they felt their voices could be heard and their conditions could improve. To 
some, it spelled the end of the war, and to others, it meant that the Tsarist autocracy’s 
mismanagement no longer stood in the way of successfully prosecuting the war. 
 
 





The February Revolution: Fault Lines Surface  
The February Revolution began on February 23, 1917, triggered by International 
Women’s Day marches. Workers protest on the streets of Petrograd and massive strikes ensued, 
and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison that were ordered to fire on the protestors soon joined 
them after initial clashes. The Petrograd Soviet formed and created the Executive Committee 
while the Duma convened and created the Provisional Committee, which would soon share 
power with the Petrograd Soviet as the Provisional Government on March 3rd. The Petrograd 
Soviet agreed to support the Provisional Government as the legitimate revolutionary government 
in so far as it upheld its promise to protect and serve the interests of workers, soldiers, and 
peasants. The Tsar abdicated on March 2nd, and thus began the short life of “democratic” 
revolutionary Russia.  
The Petrograd Soviet’s first order of business on March 1st, 1917 was the issuance of 
Soviet Order No. 1. The collapse of the army in the coming June Offensive would be rooted in 
the shockwaves of Order No. 1. In a successful move to seize soldier loyalty from the 
Provisional Government, Order No. 1 consisted of measures politically empowering soldiers 
over their own officers and called upon them to form committees and pass resolutions. At the 
outset of the February Revolution, neither the Petrograd Soviet nor the Provisional Government 
had any real power over the masses and effectively had little real administrative ability, being 
only days old. Order No. 1 spawned thousands of committees pledging their support to the 
Petrograd Soviet before the Provisional Government could even begin to exercise real authority. 
Order No. 1 The Order stipulated that soldiers were to form committees; send 
representatives to the Petrograd Soviet; put all political activities of the committee under the 
authority of the Petrograd Soviet; that orders of the Duma shall only be complied with if they do 





not contradict orders from the Petrograd Soviet; that all arms were to be kept under the control of 
the committees and not the officers; that soldiers shall have the rights of citizens; and that the use 
of hierarchical language in the military shall be abolished.46 (Is this meant to be quoted or 
paraphrased? If paraphrased, try to condense, or break up this chunk). Soldiers were 
brought directly into the revolutionary political process and were afforded the ability to make 
their voices heard. They joined the rush to organize politically and were eager to express their 
dissatisfactions through official channels. The officers could not contain soldiers’ desires for the 
implementation of Order No. 1, and any attempts to curtail their newfound freedom would be 
perceived as counter-revolution.   
Members of the army high command were shocked at the issuance of the order or The 
Order (The mention of Order No. 1 is repetitive in this section. For the sake of the reader 
try to re-word if possible). Order No. 1. In telegrams from Commander Alekseev to War 
Minister Guchkov, the commander in chief demanded that orders were to be approved by the 
Stavka before being issued to the army.47 However, command staff and senior officers realized 
that the presence of officers in soldiers’ organizations could curtail the effects of Order No. 1, 
and act as organs of power for the command staff. The command had begun to exert influence 
from above on soldiers’ committees, leading to many deputations of Kadet officers.48 Some 
members of the upper command actually felt that the democratization of the army was not 
sewing disorder, but arresting it and preventing the disintegration of the army for the time 
being.49 However, there was no doubting that Order No. 1 and its consequences were an affront 
to military discipline and the traditional structure of the army.  
Order No. 1 swept through the ranks and illustrated the importance of political 
representation to the army. A soldier’s assembly in the Petrograd Military District on March 2nd, 





1917 acted on Order No. 1, issuing a resolution calling for “Equal rights-the rights of citizens,” 
increased pay, improved provisions, shortening the general term of service, and electing a 
representative to the Petrograd Soviet.50 However, soon after the issuance of Order No. 1, fearing 
a breakdown of discipline in the military, the Petrograd Soviet was pressured by the Provisional 
Government to issue Order No. 2 on March 7th, clarifying that soldiers were not to elect their 
own officers. Then, on March 9th, the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 3, clarifying that the 
previous two orders applied only to the Petrograd Military District. A March 10th letter to the 
Petrograd Soviet from soldier A. Korolzhevich expresses his disdain at the issuance of Order No. 
3. He expounds that “[If Order No. 1 is revoked] almost nothing will have changed for us 
soldiers… As much as we were gladdened, we will now be miserable. The old apparently will be 
the new.”51 Another letter to the Petrograd Soviet from the 61st Siberian Rifle Regiment on 
March 18th directly calls for action against their officers who are preventing them from 
organizing, “The gentlemen officers are issuing punishments just as they always have and are not 
giving us any of the freedom that our brothers have won…Which is why we ask you, Gentlemen 
deputies, to free us from the old rule and arrest them.”52  
However, the soldiers of the 61st Siberian Rifle Regiment still took care to include their 
commitment to the war, “All of us our willing to lay down our lives for our freedom and for our 
existence and our dear homeland and to defeat the cursed enemies.”53 Just as the Petrograd 
Soviet supported the Provisional Government in so far as it upheld its duty of implementing 
revolution, this regiment supported the war effort in so far as their newfound rights were 
acknowledged and upheld. Another letter to the Petrograd Soviet from soldier Vasili Anifimov 
from March 13th states “The citizen officers pledged to hold discussions with soldiers, but they 
did not, and they do not want to…. Not a single soldiers’ assembly has met…It is necessary to 





accelerate the dispatch of special plenipotentiaries to explain and strengthen the soldiers’ 
confidence in the bright future of Russia and the Provisional Government.”54 While Anifimov 
does not give a direct expression of support, he does give a stern warning that conditions must 
improve in order for the Provisional Government to win the confidence of soldiers.55 Fearing 
reprisals and disorder, many officers withheld information from the rear from their soldiers, 
entrenching the deeply-rooted mistrust between soldiers and officers.  
Support for the Provisional Government in the outset of the February Revolution appears 
to be a common theme, at least on the surface, despite the confusion and disaffection from the 
issuance of Order No. 2 and Order No. 3. Despite the wishes of officers and the Provisional 
Government, soldiers outside the Petrograd Military District continued to organize in violation of 
Order No. 3, and by early April soldiers’ committees were universal, valid institutions respected 
by the higher command.56 Now connected to the constant flow of political developments in the 
rear, soldiers were encouraged to challenge the authority of officers.57 However, this did not 
come without due unrest. Officers, even if they were elected, resented their diminishing authority 
in the wake of soldier committees.58 In the Moskovskii Regiment, officers were disarmed, one 
was shot, and soldiers elected their own commanders.59 Igor Grebenkin argues that officers 
largely supported the revolution until it became clear that it was transforming the military into an 
“arena of political struggle.”60 However, though soldier-officer relations were strained, officers 
would be accepted in many cases if they simply remained idle in the barracks and heeded 
soldiers’ wishes. Soldiers “frequently took arbitrary actions, such as liberating their arrested 
comrades from the guardhouse” while junior officers, fearing reprisals, “simple looked the other 
way.”61 In a larger context, the Provisional Government wished to work with the fragile 
committee structure of the army, and proceeded cautiously in maintaining democratization while 





attempting to restore order from the Petrograd Soviet’s unrest caused by the issuance of Order 
No. 1.  
Committee work, particularly above the regiment level, attracted the most educated 
among the ranks.62 Mostly educated, urban, and highly political junior officers dominated the 
committee structure and presented liberal and moderate socialist political positions.63 Wildman 
calls them the “committee class,” who would continuously alienate their soldier constituencies 
through May and June through fervent support for the war, the June Offensive, and for 
restoration of order in the army.64 This phenomenon led to a mass of liberal and Menshevik 
soldiers’ deputies presenting a patriotism unparalleled by troops at the front.65 The command 
staff had begun to exert influence on the committee structure, invading the space of the 
revolutionary organs at the cost of sacrificing military tradition. This rising “committee class” 
could explain why the increasingly non-noble, heterogenous social composition of the officer 
corps did little to transform the image of the repressive tsarist officer many fondly held. 
Grebenkin argues that officers’ actions cannot be explained by their social backgrounds, but 
rather by their “specific situation, the environment, as well as their expectations for the 
revolution.”66 
The surface consensus seen in the aftermath of the February Revolution promised further 
support for the war in so far as the rights of soldiers as citizens and political participants were 
respected. However, fault lines of conflict on the issues of soldier rights were presenting, as 
committees began to stray from the revolutionary aspirations of their constituencies and 
exacerbate the long-standing grievances against officers and command staff through the next 
flash points of revolutionary conflict.  Above all, the issuance of Order No. 1 illustrated the 
widely the first failure of “dual power,” and its one clear result was that soldiers declared their 





loyalty overwhelmingly to the Petrograd Soviet, and not the Provisional Government, as any 
significant retraction in the revolution could have possibly meant their execution for treason. 
 
The April Crisis: Division Deepens 
 The revolution’s first crisis unfolded over the issue of war aims in April of 1917. It 
established the war as the most contentious issue of the Revolution early on in 1917. Dubbed the 
“April Crisis,” it resulted from the Provisional Governments March 27th declaration on war aims 
primarily authored by Foreign Minister Pavel Miliukov. The declaration read “It shall 
unswervingly carrying out the people’s will and defend our motherland’s rights, while fully 
observing the obligations that we have assumed in relation to our allies.”67 On April 18th, Pavel 
Miliukov informed Russia’s allies in a secret note that Russia would stand by Tsarist agreements 
concerning the annexation of Ottoman territory, “that the Provisional Government, while 
defending our motherland’s rights, will fully adhere to the obligations taken on in relation to our 
allies.68 Miliukov’s note was published, causing mass protests in Petrograd on the 20th and 21st of 
April that called for Miliukov’s resignation, peace without annexation or indemnities, and more 
broadly an end to the war.  
On March 14th, the Petrograd Soviet had issued a statement on war aims, “To All the 
World’s People,” opposing annexation and calling upon the proletariat of belligerent nations to 
rise and call for peace.69 Accounts indicate that some soldiers accepted this as a viable course of 
action, feeling a sense of brotherhood with the proletariat of belligerent nations. An April 13th 
letter to War Minister Aleksandr Guchkov from soldiers of the 64th Infantry Division asked for 
peace and proclaimed, “they are not our enemies but are our brothers in the cross and in the 
divine commandments.”70 German sources highlight a notable degree of fraternization among 





enemy troops, with German intelligence officers often able to speak to Russian soldiers disguised 
as “socialists.”71 However, other accounts reveal a failure to reconcile this perception with 
reality. The 186h Artillery Division from the 12th Army perceives German militarism as a threat 
to the revolution, stating, “Russia is awaiting an answer to this appeal; but comrades, the German 
people are still silent, Wilhelm’s regiments, having taken advantage of our summons, have left 
insignificant units against us and come crashing down in a great mass on our allies…” As the 
Petrograd Soviet continued to support revolutionary defense, the contradictory war policy of 
moderate socialists became clear. Heenan (contextualize this individual, who is he?) describes 
this confusing policy succinctly, writing that “The German soldier was the Russian soldiers’ 
brother; but he must be killed, while the Russian officer-a class enemy-must be obeyed.”72 
 During the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of March 29th-April 3rd, leaders of the 
Petrograd Soviet passed a resolution supporting revolutionary defensism and the Provisional 
Government, maintaining that “Free Russia’s aim is to establish a stable peace on the basis of 
based on self-determination. The Russian people do not intend to increase its world power at the 
expense of other peoples. Its aim is not to enslave or humiliate anyone.”73 The Petrograd Soviet 
had unintentionally bound itself to the Provisional Government in implicit support for 
Miliukov’s secret war aims of conquest, demonstrating that it was unable to put together a 
coherent policy on the war.74 As Miliukov himself writes in his history of the Russian 
Revolution, “It did not adopt any decision, either in the night session or in the morning, except 
one to review the situation together with the Provisional Government.”75 Facing massive public 
pressure from mass demonstrations in the streets, the two organs of “Dual Power” issued 
respective clarifications on the matter. The Provisional Government clarified the language used 
in its initial statement, stating that the Miliukov note did not contradict its statement on war 





aims.76 The Petrograd Soviet rushed to issue its own explanation to maintain its position of 
supporting the Provisional Government on the grounds that it rejects “imperialist war aims.”77 
Miliukov resigned from his post, but the April Crisis had renewed the issues it was inescapably 
intertwined with, democratization and discipline in the army, the war, and “Dual Power.”  
The Miliukov note served to radicalize the army and diminish their initial support for the 
war as the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet’s perceptions and rhetoric were 
beginning quickly to fall behind reality. Once content with revolutionary defensism and the 
ability to make their voices heard, soldiers began to become disillusioned with the Provisional 
Government and the war effort and increasingly called for peace. Soldiers from the Finnish 
Guards Regiment Battalion Committee drafted a more moderate letter on April 20th that limited 
their malice solely to Miliukov, conducting a peaceful protest in tandem with their officers 
supporting the Petrograd Soviet’s position on the war.78 An April 20th resolution by the Petrograd 
Garrison’s Reserve Electro-Technical Battalion Committee was so radical and class-oriented that 
it was published in Pravda, the Bolshevik publication, calling the Provisional Government a 
“faithful servant not only of the imperialist countries, but also of the German and Austrian 
governments, as it assists them in strangling the German proletariat’s evolving struggle for 
peace.”79 The resolution demanded that the government “take the most energetic steps to work 
out a platform with the Allied governments for peace without annexation or indemnities.”80 A 
late April letter to the chairman of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies from a soldier 
in the 753rd Reserve Regiment called for outright peace and denounced the Petrograd Soviet’s 
continued support for the war, “We have heard that you want war and to support our dear allies 
[sic] England. Well, you can support them yourselves… Our 753rd regiment is standing now in 
reserve but we won’t go back down into the trenches any more.”81 The letter clearly 





differentiates between the broader state goals of the Provisional Government and the reality of 
life on the front and the growing alienation of soldiers from political leadership.  
As the first liberal cabinet of the Provisional Government collapsed, the moderate 
socialists of the Petrograd Soviet joined the liberals in a new coalition government. Alexander 
Kerensky became the War Minister of the new coalition government, and together with the 
moderate socialist and liberal cabinet, would have the final say on issue of war aims and the 
coming June Offensive. On May 5th the coalition government declared a “preliminary” revision 
of war aims and called for “’peace without annexations or indemnities,’” ” illustrating that their 
policy on the war was no more coherent than the former cabinets’.82 The liberals’ unwillingness 
to authentically revise their war aims, and the moderate socialists’ eroding ability to sell 
revolutionary defensism to the masses resulted in the establishment of the Bolsheviks as the sole 
conduit of achieving peace through the revolution.  
Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik party, convinced the Bolshevik leadership to 
adopt his April Theses as the party’s official platform in April. The April These called for 
complete peace, calling out revolutionary defensism as a “cloak for a war of conquest, to enrich 
the capitalists,” and calling for steadfast opposition to the Provisional Government.”83 He 
promised land, bread, and peace, along with a whole host of class-based reforms and the creation 
of a soviet government. Most importantly, he, and the Bolshevik party by extension, separated 
himself themselves? from the moderate socialists on the issue of the war and participation with 
the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks promised peace, not “total victory,” and not 
“revolutionary defensism.” A letter from the soldiers of the 727th Novo-Silidginsky Regiment 
published in Pravda (contextualize this publication in one sentence? What is it? Why is it 
important?), called for an end to the war and proclaiming, “Haven’t the bourgeoisie and the 





capitalists already filled their pockets with bloody coins? We workers and peasants, dressed in 
our gray overcoats, do not need this bloody slaughter.84 Despite being published in Pravda, the 
Bolshevik party’s central publication, it nonetheless shows that the Bolshevik position resonated 
with some soldiers. The mass-radicalization of soldiers was well underway, simply because due 
to the fact that, as Heenan articulates, “… the Russian people wanted peace more than they 
wanted any particular political system.”85 The failure of liberals and moderate socialists to accept 
a sweeping anti-war consensus continued to cost them the allegiance of soldiers and widespread 
popular support. 
 
Rhetoric of the Offensive 
 The June Offensive was planned by the Tsarist government but executed by the First 
Coalition Government of liberals and moderate socialists. At the three meetings of the Entente 
military staffs in Paris, Chantilly, and Mogilev, the Tsarist government had pledged to launch a 
support sometime in the middle of 1917. After the meetings in Paris and Chantilly decided on 
simultaneous offensives on the Austro-German forces, the meeting at the Stavka in Mogilev in 
December of 1916 decided the fate of the June Offensive. General Brusilov proposed an 
offensive along the Southwestern front, pushing toward Lvov, followed by secondary offensives 
on all fronts.86 Though no final decision was made, a consensus was reached that the offensive 
would push through the Southwestern front.87 General Alekseev made the final decision, sending 
the offensive’s plans to the Tsar and receiving approval without changes on the 24th of January, 
1917.88 As Minister of War in the Coalition Government, Alexander Kerensky, bound by the 
Tsarist government’s agreements to the Entente and determined to bring order to the revolution, 
ordered the June Offensive on June 16th, 1917.89  





 Kerensky had hoped that a “significant Russian contribution to Germany’s defeat” would 
give Russia leverage in the peace settlement, and that the moderate socialists followed suit in this 
mode of thinking. 90 Whether there were guarantees that this was solely to preserve the 
possibility of a peace without annexation or indemnities is unknown, as Iuli Martov’s speech 
observed. When initially arguing for the offensive at the Smolensk Soviet, Kerensky, in a more 
moderate tone, argued that an offensive would force the Germans to agree to “a general peace 
with no annexations or indemnities and the right of national self-determination.”91 The 
Declaration of May 5, upon which the Coalition Government established a significant degree of 
its legitimacy, rejected a separate peace but argued for a general peace based on military 
strength.92 This policy did have grounds in pragmatism, as a German victory on the western front 
would almost certainly guarantee an all-out offensive on the eastern front, and by extension an 
all-out offensive on the revolution. 
 Moderate socialists largely supported the war, with only internationalists opposing it as a 
minority of the soviets. The June 19th session of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviet hosted 
speeches by Menshevik revolutionary defensists, Socialist Revolutionary defensist Viktor 
Chernov, and a Menshevik-Internationalist.93 Irakli Tsetereli, a Menshevik defensist, defended 
the Provisional Government’s “revised” position on war aims, while supporting the June 
Offensive whole-heartedly in a manner reminiscent of the Provisional Government’s earlier 
“total victory” stance.94 Socialist Revolutionary defensist Viktor Chernov also peddled a 
defensist platform, but he offered a more hardline attitude, “As soon as peace becomes possible 
on the principles formulated by revolutionary Russia’s urban and rural working class and army, 
then the war must not continue for a single moment.”95 Menshevik defensist Matvei Skobolev 
used more revolutionary language, but displays what earlier in the year would be the words of a 





Kadet agitating against the democratization of the army, “We awoke to the belief that the war 
will not snuff out the revolution; the revolution will snuff out the war.”96 Iuli Martov, a 
Menshevik-Internationalist, the sole opponent of the offensive and the war in the congress, clung 
to frail hope that international socialism would bring the war to an end.97 Despite this, his words 
offered a clarity found in none of the other speeches. He recognized that the offensive was 
planned under the Tsarist administration, and he recognized the contradictory nature of the 
Coalition’s move toward the offensive, calling it “this latest overthrow of the Russian 
revolution’s policy.”98  
With the help of moderate socialists, the revolutionary committee structure of the military 
had been employed in the full service of preparing for the offensive.99 Army congresses were 
used to generate enthusiasm for the offensive, restore discipline, quickly mobilize, and train and 
prepare for the coming offensive. 100 The organs of revolutionary power had been transformed 
into instruments of what would have been called counter-revolution earlier in the year.101 
Resistance to orders from above had been previously pacified through influence on the 
committees from senior officers and the high command, but the coming offensive had facilitated 
significant front mutinies.102 Though observed as a larger phenomenon of “trench bolshevism,” 
many significant acts of unrest occurred in units without major Bolshevik influence.103 These 
soldier mutinies, though removed from the Bolsheviks politically, signified to the Coalition 
Government the very real threat of radical political platform that adequately interpreted and 
responded to the popular aspirations of soldiers. 
 The Bolsheviks responded to the coming offensive by organizing mass demonstrations, 
banned by the government, in the capital to counter pro-offensive demonstrations sponsored by 
the Petrograd Soviet. The Bolshevik’s June 18th appeal to workers and soldiers to join the 





protests included the slogans, “All Power to the Soviets,” and “Revise the ‘Declaration of 
Soldiers’ Rights.’”104 While including the radical call for Soviet power, the Bolsheviks’ also 
appealed to a fundamental desire of soldiers, the preservation of their newfound voice in the face 
of restored authority in preparation for the offensive. Liberal publications lashed out against the 
Bolsheviks, accusing them of treason, working with German spies, and calling their 
demonstrations “dull and perfunctory.”105 However, the Bolsheviks did not have to do much to 
garner support from soldiers, as they were the only party actively opposing those who were 
“impelling them toward what they could only perceive as senseless slaughter.”106   
 
Kerensky’s Offensive: The Last Straw 
 The Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh armies lay in wait on the Russian lines of the 
Southwestern front, extending from the Western front south to the Romanian front.107 Their 
objective was to push through Galicia to capture Lvov, pushing back the Southern German 
Armies and the Austrian Second, Third, and Fourth Armies.108 Russian artillery outgunned the 
Austro-German forces two-to-one due to the arrival of allied military aid, and carefully-selected 
volunteer shock units were made to head the charge.109 On the 16th of June, the Russians 
bombarded the Austro-German lines between the Seventh and Eleventh armies in Galicia for two 
days in the largest Russian artillery barrage of the war.110 Then, on the 18th of June, Kerensky, 
who had been touring regiments on the front rallying them to advance, writes, “It was zero hour. 
For a second we were griped by a terrible fear that the soldiers might refuse to fight. Then we 
saw the first lines of infantry, with their rifles at the ready, charging toward the front lines of 
German trenches.”111 





 The Russian army smashed through enemy lines on the 18th and 19th of June. The Austro-
German forces were pushed back an average of over two miles along the Southwestern front, and 
the Russians had “captured several fortified villages, 29 guns, 300 officers, and 18,000 men.”112 
The victories of June 18th and 19th were hailed across the country, but the offensive was halted 
the next day. Units settled into Austrian trenches, refusing to attack unless more artillery cleared 
the way, flanks were opened up by mass desertions, and captured towns were looted of liquor 
caches.113 A battalion set to replace Kal’nitskii’s 35th division of the Eleventh Army refused to 
budge with two other regiments in their division following suit.114 Significant amounts of troops 
in the rear sectors refused to support the front in its most dire times of need, demanding further 
artillery support or express orders from the Petrograd Soviet.115 Shock units and “death 
battalions,” created to bolster the loyalty and morale of the troops, had been killed off and only 
“attracted bitterness from the units who refused to fight or retreated in disorder.”116  Even 
divisions who had the most success in breaking through enemy lines had still suffered massive 
casualties and demanded immediate replacement.117 
 Halts in the advancement of the troops were blamed on Bolshevik agitation, but a pattern 
of regiments completely shutting down with little to no Bolshevik influence emerged. The XXII 
Corps had made significant advances and were crucial to the push on the town of Brzezany, but 
were promptly pushed back, and according to General Obruchev, “… not only willfully deserted 
the trenches in the night of June 19, but ridiculed those soldiers who remained in the 
trenches.”118 The I Guard Corps, who had assured commissar Stankevich that they would follow 
“all legitimate orders of the Provisional Government,” refused to move to their assigned 
positions.119 The Eighth Army, under General Kornilov, which a command report from June 23rd 





states was the host of severe Bolshevik agitation, was the most successful of the armies attacking 
on the Southwestern front. 120  
The Southwestern front was an absolute failure, wrought with general disorder, massive 
losses, and paralyzed regiments. General Selivachev reported on June 30th, “All corps of the 
army after the unsuccessful battles of June 18-20 are in the highest degree demoralized. The 
consistent flouting of battle orders, unauthorized departures from positions, and refusals to 
replace other units on the line have become an everyday occurrence. The work of committees of 
all denominations yields no results.”121 The secondary attacks on the Northern and Western 
fronts were likewise doomed to failure, with every army, division, regiment, and battalion 
suffering similar fates. 
A reconnaissance attack of the Russian Tenth Army lost 12,200 men on a single day, 
with its divisions losing more than half of their troops.122 The Second Army’s commander gave a 
stark report, claiming that “not a single unit in his army was reliable, while the commander of the 
Third Army reported that one of his corps could only be relied on for defense.”123 The 28th 
Division, reported to be in relatively good order, utterly collapsed upon combat.124 An officer of 
the Western Front Command Staff sent a report to the Supreme High command Staff describing 
soldiers of the 1st Siberian Corps, the 62nd Siberian Regiment, half of the 63rd Siberian Regiment, 
and men of the 3rd Regiment refusing to advance. 125 Perhaps the most disheartening symptom of 
collapse was the mutiny of the 703rd regiment, who had directed their anger at leaders of the 
Petrograd Soviet, beating members of the Executive Committee who had been sent to persuade 
unruly units, including the author of Order No. 1, N.D. Sokolov.126 General Denikin, unable to 
control the soldiers, reassigned them to the rear, recounting, “depriving myself at one stroke 
without a shot being fired of 30,000 troops.”127  





Though Bolshevik agitation appears not to be a factor in the collapse of the offensive, 
Bolshevik activity among the attacking armies was not entirely the hyperbolic projection of the 
command staff. Closer to the center of revolutionary activity, Petrograd, the soldiers of the 
Northern and Western front armies were more exposed to Bolshevik agitation and presented 
radical behavior. The 436th Novoladozhskii Regiment, who published Okopnaia Pravda, the 
Bolshevik front newspaper, had influenced the XXXVII Corps, and the 135th Division was under 
constant agitation by soldiers from Kronstadt.128 The 436th Regiment joined Latvian and 
Estonian peasants in plundering German estates, and the 135th Division had killed General P. A. 
Noskov during a riot over their transfer to the front.129  
As an unprecedented level of mutinies, desertions, and disorders proliferated through the 
front, and a complete and decentralized rout began. Units met independently and decided upon 
retreat, passing resolutions against the offensive and refusing orders to reinforce futile positions 
in the wake of Austro-German counterattacks. The “Death Battalion” of the Eleventh army 
captured 12,000 deserters near the city of Volochisk in a single night.130 However, without 
disciplinary measures owing to the legacy of Order No. 1, there was little punishment for these 
men. Large swaths of the Russian army were reduced to roving, unorganized bands of men 
retreating eastward.  The Southwestern Front Committee addressed the war ministry, the Soviet 
Central Executive Committee, the Peasant’s Soviet, and the Commander in Chief with a 
harrowing report, “There is no longer a trace of authority and obedience to command… For 
hundreds of miles the soldiers stream to the rear, with weapons and without. Knowing there is no 
risk of punishment, they flee without shame, sometimes by entire units.”131 
The Russian army had experienced the revolutionary organs of power that gave them 
their voice, committees, congresses, the soviets, all used to send them to certain death in the 





trenches. The brief respite from generations of social grievances had opened and closed in the 
blink of an eye. They had experienced those revolutionary organs of power used to repress them 
and begin to restore the authority that their resentment of toppled the Tsar. They had been sent 
deep into enemy territory on a war to protect a revolution that promised “peace without 
annexation or indemnities,” to kill the Austro-German proletariat that those in the Petrograd 
Soviet called their brothers. The June Offensive had collapsed, and with it the notions of the 
February Revolution that inspired them to stay in the trenches, and through all this only the most 
radical political party, the Bolsheviks, accurately articulated and catered to their sentiment. As 
contemporary historian Igor Grebenkin saliently states, “The destruction of the traditional 
foundations of military life was replaced by the destruction of the organizational unity of the 
army…”132  
 
The Last Gasp of Authority and the Call for Soviet Power 
  On July 2nd, the First Coalition Government collapsed, sparked by tensions between the 
liberals and the moderate socialists over Viktor Chernov’s land directives and the issue of 
Ukrainian autonomy. The Kadets resigned in protest of the Coalition Government’s publishing 
of an agreement to grant the Ukrainian Rada independent administrative authority. The next day, 
armed protests erupted in the streets of Petrograd, owing to soldiers’ disillusionment from and 
hostility to the June Offensive coupled with the growing grievances of urban workers. Soldiers 
of the Petrograd garrison and other urban centers were particularly set off by instructions to 
disband and remove units that had refused to join the June Offensive. Soldiers of the 1st Machine 
Gun Regiment planned armed protests, electing a Provisional Revolutionary Committee to 
recruit other army units to join the demonstrations.133 Working with active Bolshevik and 





anarchist elements, even including sailors from the Kronstadt naval base, the protests swelled 
with armed soldiers and workers into the tens of thousands. The protests took on a darker tone 
than that of February, with armed clashes, looting, leaving up to four hundred dead. The 
demonstrators demanded power be transferred to the Petrograd Soviet, among calls for an end to 
the war. In the midst of the chaos, the Bolsheviks refused to take command of the protests, and 
the Petrograd Soviet moved to denounce the demonstrations as a Bolshevik uprising, deeming 
them counter revolutionary. 
 With the shock of the disintegration of the army and the armed protests, the likes of 
which had not been seen since February, the government set out on a war path against the 
Bolsheviks. After quelling the unrest of the demonstrations, the Provisional Government 
published documents alleging that the Bolsheviks were receiving money from Germany, and that 
Lenin was in fact a German spy.134 The Provisional Government raided and shut down the 
editorial offices of Pravda, as well as the party headquarters. Bolshevik leaders were captured 
and arrested en masse, forcing Lenin to go into hiding in Finland. In solidarity with the Kadets, 
Prime Minister Lvov too stepped down following the collapse of the Coalition Government, 
recommending Kerensky in his place, “In order to save the country, it is now necessary to shut 
down the Soviet and shoot at the people. I cannot do that. Kerensky can.”135 
 In parallel to the crackdown in the rear, Kerensky, as prime minister, followed suit on the 
front in attempt to contain the complete collapse of the military ranks brought on by the June 
Offensive. A report drafted by commissars under General Kornilov, now commander of all three 
armies of the Southwestern front, was sent to Kerensky on the 9th of July. The report detailed the 
German counterattack on the Eleventh Army that began on July 6th, informing Kerensky of the 
“fatal crisis” of the morale of the troops of the June Offensive.136 “For a distance of several 





hundred versts long files of deserters… who have lost all shame and feel that they can act 
altogether with impunity, are proceeding to the rear of the army.”137 Kornilov had issued a July 
8th order authorizing command personnel to fire on deserters, and had been pressuring Kerensky 
to implement strict disciplinary measures, threatening to resign. Kerensky promptly replied  with 
an order to the army and navy, “that military discipline be restored, implementing the full force 
of revolutionary power, including recourse to force of arms.”138 The order also granted the 
authority “to shoot without trial all those who rob, use force on, to kill peaceful citizens, and all 
those who refuse to carry out military orders,” as well as instituting military censorship.139 The 
order solidified the disillusionment with the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, 
as long as it participated in the Provisional Government, among many soldiers.  
 Fully committed to the agenda of restoring firm civil and military authority, Kerensky 
replaced General Brusilov with General Kornilov as supreme commander of the Russian 
military, owing to his relative fame and hardline stance on the crisis of mass disorder, mutiny, 
and desertion among the ranks. The chaos of the June Offensive had radicalized the right as 
much as it had radicalized the common soldier. Kornilov, along with members of the command 
staff and officer organizations, came to believe he could salvage the Russian state from utter ruin 
at the hands of reckless left-socialists, and that the Provisional Government had grown impotent 
and incompetent. As the supreme commander, Kornilov came to represent the last hope of the 
right against the onslaught of revolutionary chaos, enjoying widespread support among officers 
for his military reforms.  
After the Moscow State Conference, in which Kornilov clamored for order to the 
applause of conservatives, tensions broke out between him and Kerensky over mutual distrust. 
On the 27th of August, Kornilov’s mutiny fell through as he overestimated his support from the 





army, who were broken by the June Offensive. Though many officers supported Kornilov, they 
supported his image and his policy for a stronger government and military but failed to mobilize 
their support into counterrevolutionary action when the time came. Matthew Rendle 
characterizes the officer corps as a highly heterogenous social group that is unfairly marginalized 
to being studied solely in tandem with the Kornilov Affair.  
 The high command of the army lost its legitimacy in one fell swoop. The Petrograd 
Soviet had appealed to the Bolsheviks for aid, who raised 25,000 Bolshevik “Red Guard” armed 
workers, who “defended” the capital from the long-awaited counter-revolutionary thrust.140 With 
the threat from the far right vanquished, the far left was emboldened, energized, and legitimized 
into a viable oppositional force capable of challenging the frail Provisional Government.  
The Kornilov Affair marked a massive shift to the left in popular politics. In August and 
September of 1917, all left socialist parties made massive gains in elections to the soviets, and by 
October the left socialists boasted majorities in every single major soviet. In the Petrograd city 
duma, the 20th  of August elections saw the Bolsheviks win 33.5 percent of the vote.141 In 
September 19th elections to the Moscow Soviet, electing majority Bolshevik executive 
committees and a new presidium, while gaining a majority in the Moscow city duma.142 
Elections to other mass organizations and political organs followed suit. As Kerensky was 
forming the third coalition government, many had come to associate the Kadets with Kornilov’s 
counterrevolution, the war, and political inaction. The Soviet’s authority increased, the 
Bolsheviks’ influence grew, the disintegration of the army further intensified, and the peasant 
revolution in the countryside reached crisis levels. The third coalition government was 
practically powerless, committed to limited action until the Constituent assembly, while 
socialists actively discussed forming an all-socialist government that would exclude propertied 





elements. At the Second Congress of Soviets on the 25th of October, the Bolsheviks made up 300 
of the 570 delegates, and together with the left socialist revolutionaries formed a majority.143 As 
the Red Guards seized control of strategic points and besieged the Winter Palace, the Second 
Congress convened. As they debated bourgeoise inclusion in the new all-socialist government, 
the October Revolution was well underway. Amid massive food and supply shortages to cities 
and the front, as well as the looming prospect of widespread starvation in the countryside, the 
Bolshevik’s seizure of power appeared to some to be a path to salvation. To conservatives and 
liberals, it was the final push over the edge into the depths of anarchy and civil war. The prime 
beneficiaries of the chaos and disorder of the February Revolution and the utter ruin of the June 
Offensive were the very perpetrators of the October Revolution.  
 
Conclusion 
 Heenan characterizes the June Offensive as the central event of the Russian Revolution 
and as the “straw that broke the camel’s back” of Russian democracy. She also characterizes the 
decision-making behind the offensive as foolish, if not outright suicidal. However, the hubris and 
ignorance of the June Offensive is easier to identify in hindsight. Kerensky’s reasoning behind 
the offensive was relatively sound. Without leverage, appeasing popular demands for peace 
would mean granting damning annexations and indemnities and violating the rights of the 
Russian people to self-determination. Though the offensive explicitly appeared to violate the 
philosophy of revolutionary defensism on the surface, the possible leverage in a peace 
negotiation from a military success of such scale would preserve the policy as a viable course of 
action by preserving territorial integrity. Kerensky was fending off a violent conquest by an 
imperial power to protect revolutionary Russia as well as striking at Bolshevik influence, who 





were widely held as German agents of sorts. A successful offensive would also mean a 
substantial increase in foreign military and civilian aid if the Russian army were to show promise 
on the battlefield. However, this reasoning is simply not reconcilable with the state of the 
Russian army at the time and the amount of anti-war sentiment and war weariness among the 
Russian army and population. If anything, it was a shot in the dark in hopes of achieving the 
impossible. Heenan correctly characterizes the offensive as a fatal gamble. Wildman 
characterizes the June Offensive as an episode in the long process of the disintegration of the 
Russian Army going back to the Great Reforms. He does not define it as a central event in the 
revolution, as his study is a massive work spanning decades of the Russian Imperial Army, but 
he does attribute the utter ruin of the army to the scale and style of destruction brought by the 
June Offensive. He makes sure to give due attention to the June Offensive’s small and sporadic 
successes but does not shy away from its sheer collapse. His study provides nuance where 
Heenan’s provides a one-dimensional argument, but the findings of this essay would give more 
credence to the centrality of the June Offensive argued by Heenan.  
 The officer corps presents a conundrum in studying the June Offensive. Though they 
were increasingly of non-noble origins from the Great Reforms to the massive casualty rate of 
officers in World War I, the image of the counterrevolutionary officer persisted and even 
strengthened in late 1917. Several explanations arise, such as the downward pressure from senior 
officers and command staff and the formation of the “committee class” as Wildman describes. 
However, though this appears to be a lackluster argument, the study of the officer corps is an 
exceedingly understudied field of scholarship on the Russian Revolution. Matthew Rendle and 
Igor Grebenkin, contemporary historians on the Russian Revolution, are providing invaluable 
studies on the officer corps and giving nuance and depth to a field that was once exclusively 





pegged to the study of the Kornilov Affair. Matthew Rendle argues that the officer corps were 
not inherently counterrevolutionary and that their professional interests transcended political 
positions. Grebenkin delves deeper into military tradition and the transition from serving the 
revolutionary government to operating under Soviet government and in civil war.  
The Russian Army served as a microcosm of Russian society at large, bereft with long 
standing social grievances, suppressed aspirations, and deteriorating conditions. The February 
Revolution transformed the Russian Imperial Army from a caste system in personal service to 
the Tsar into a radical experiment in revolutionary democracy overnight with the issue of Order 
No. 1, just as it had done to Russian society with the advent of “dual power.” The shock wave 
sent through the army spurred soldiers to organize politically and wrest power from the officers 
and command staff, who they correctly perceived as vestigial organs of the autocracy, in one fell 
swoop, if only for a short while. However, the Provisional Government embarked on a process of 
converting the committees, commissars, and deputies into organs of control and authority in 
preparation for the coming June Offensive. The hopeful consensus of early 1917, support for the 
war and the Provisional Government in exchange for democratization, had begun to erode. Given 
democratization, the soldiers were to have it slowly stripped from them and their voices were to 
be duly ignored as they were thrown into certain death in the conquest of enemy territory, but 
without annexations or indemnities, in an offensive born of “revolutionary defensism.” Alienated 
from the liberals and moderate socialists of the Provisional Government on the issue of war aims, 
due to Miliukov’s note, and denied their rights ordained in Order No. 1, the soldiers returned 
from the disastrous offensive as roving bands of broken men longing for peace. Meanwhile the 
Offensive had elevated General Kornilov to power and given the 1st Machine Gun Regiment the 
alienation it needed to arrest the nation in the July Days. The June Offensive was the final 





threshold before the political center was thoroughly hollowed out, intensifying social and 
political polarization and radicalizing both left and right, ultimately leading to the collapse of 
revolutionary government and sewing the seeds for the Bolshevik takeover in the October 
Revolution.  
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